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Résumé / Abstract
On étudie la détermination endogène du choix de devenir entrepreneur.
Les éléments importants du modèle sont le risque moral, l’aversion au risque, et la
distribution des richesses. On démontre que, sous certaines hypothèses, seuls
deviennent entrepreneurs les individus qui ne sont ni puissamment riches, ni
pauvres. Ils investissent dans des projets aux rendements incertains, en
empruntant de l’argent auprès de gens plus pauvres ou plus riches qu’eux-mêmes.
Le taux d’intérêt en équilibre dépend de la fonction de distribution des richesses.
Par conséquent, les pays ayant le même niveau de richesse moyenne peuvent être
très différents les uns des autres.
This paper examines the endogenous determination of the choice between
an entrepreneur and a pure lender. The model relies on three key factors: risk
aversion, wealth distribution, and moral hazard. We show that, under certain
assumptions, only agents in the middle range of the wealth distribution choose to
be entrepreneurs, while very wealthy agents (i.e., those at the high end of the
wealth distribution) and agents at the low end of the wealth distribution find it
optimal to be lenders, and avoid being entrepreneurs. Only entrepreneurs invest
in risky projects, and they borrow topartially finance their investments. Thus, two
countries with the same population size and the same per capita wealth may
behave differently from each other, even when individuals have identical
preferences (i.e., identical utility functions), because of the difference in the
distribution of wealth. We also demonstrate how changes in the wealth
distribution (while keeping the mean level of wealth constant) within a given
country can lead to a switch in its international net indebtness position: a debtor
country can become a creditor country.
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1 Introduction
This paper demonstrates how changes in the weath distribution (while keep-
ing the mean level of wealth constant) within a given country can lead to a
switch in its international net indebtness position: a debtor country can be-
come a creditor country. The model relies on three key factors: risk aversion,
wealth distribution, and moral hazard. We show that, under certain assump-
tions, only agents in the middle range of the wealth distribution choose to be
entrepreneurs, while very wealthy agents (i.e., those at the high end of the
wealth distribution) and agents at the low end of the wealth distribution nd
it optimal to be lenders, and avoid being entrepreneurs. Only entrepreneurs
invest in risky projects, and they borrow to partially nance their invest-
ments. Thus, two countries with the same population size and the same per
capita wealth may behave dierently from each other, even when individu-
als have identical preferences (i.e., identical utility functions), because of the
dierence in the distribution of wealth.
We also study the eect of the policy of bailing out rms that have nan-
cial diculties. If this bailing out is nanced by taxing successful rms, the
net eect of the policy is an increase in the number of entrepreneurs at any
given market rate of interest. To restore equilibrium, the rate of interest must
rise. For a two-country world, this analysis implies that, ceteris paribus, the
country that has such a bail-out policy will become a net borrower.
An interesting feature of the paper is the endogenous determination of the
entrepreneur (as opposed to non-entrepreneur) status. Individuals with iden-
tical utility functions but dierent wealth endowments self-select to be (or
not to be) entrepreneur. In our model, the outcome of any investment project
depends on the eort level of the entrepreneur in charge of the project. This
eort level is not observable by lenders or nancial intermediaries. Contracts
are designed to give entrepreneurs incentive to exert eort. While these con-
tracts mitigate against opportunism by entrepreneurs, they cannot replicate
the outcome that would be obtained under symmetric information.An impor-
tant implication of our model is that a well-designed redistribution of wealth
may stimulate risk-taking activities and result in a higher growth rate.
Our paper builds on, and extends, earlier contributions to the literature
that connects income distribution to occupational choice in the context of
capital market imperfections. It is useful to oer here a brief comparison
of assumptions and results. Galor and Ziera (1993) consider a model with
irreversible investment involving xed costs. They assume that agents borrow
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to nance their investment in skill acquisition, and bequeath some of their
wealth. The lending rate is higher than the borrowing rate, and the cost of
borrowing is higher for borrowers with low initial wealth. The amounts these
borrowers bequeath are also smaller. The authors show that agents whose
wealth lies below a threshold level nd it optimal to choose unskilled jobs,
with low wages. As a result, their descendents will also choose to be unskilled
workers due to their low level of inherited wealth. A similar model is studied
by Banerji and Newman (1993) who assume that borrowers need to oer
collaterals to lenders. Children of poor individuals do not inherit much, and
therefore cannot oer sucient collaterals to potential lenders. They are thus
forced to choose not to be entrepreneurs. de Meza and Webb (1999) show
that lack of information on the part of banks may lead to an over-provision of
loans that encourages entry into entrepreneurship. If the associated incentive
eects are strong, then there will be a positive relationship between wealth
and entrepreneurial activities.
Aghion and Bolton (1997) formulate a model similar to ours, but they
assume that all agents are risk-neutral. The probability of success of a project
is dependent on the eort level chosen by the entrepreneur. In their model,
individuals in the right-hand tail of the wealth distribution are entrepreneurs
who do not borrow, while individuals in the middle section of the wealth
distribution need to borrow to be entrepreneurs, because they do not have
sucient wealth to pay for the lumpy investment. This is in marked contrast
to our result that, in some cases, very wealthy individuals may nd it optimal
not to be entrepreneur. The dierence is partly due to the fact that we
assume (a) risk aversion and (b) bankruptcy cost is non-zero, while Aghion
and Bolton assume risk neutrality and strictly limited liability (zero payments
to banks in the event of project failure).
Newman (1995) assumes risk aversion, and nd that, under moral hazard,
the poorer individuals tend to be risk-takers and wealthy individuals are risk-
averters. This may be explained as follows. Optimal contract under moral
hazard serve to resolve the tension between consumption- smoothing across
states of nature, and ecient deployment of eort. We know that wealthier
individuals tend to need less insurance at the margin. Optimal contracts
prompt them to bear more risk at any given eort level. Individuals with
greater wealth nd it too costly (in terms of eort) to bear risks, as designed
in the contracts.
All the models cited above share a common assumption: there is no
transfer of resources from the entrepreneurs to the lenders in the event of
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project failure. This may be called the \strong limited liability" assumption.
Our model allow a weaker version of limited liability: we assume that part of
an entrepreneur's private savings must be used to pay debts in the event of
project failure. In addition, we assume the existence of a small real resource
cost in the settling of a bankruptcy case. These twin assumptions play an
important role in our model. We nd that the very poor do not take risks,
because the marginal utilty of wealth in the event of bankruptcy is very
high. We also nd that the very rich do not become entrepreneurs, because
the eort is very costly.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we develop a model of
a closed economy, and state the assumptions and notation. In Section 3, we
characterize equilibrium loan contracts under moral hazard, and show how
the equilibrium riskless rate of interest is determined. Section 4 deals with
international borrowing.
2 The Basic Model: A Closed EconomyWith
Moral Hazard
2.1 Assumptions and Notations
We begin by considering a model of a closed economy. There is a continuum
of individuals in this economy. They dier in their initial wealth, denoted by
w. The (cumulative) distribution of initial wealth is F (w), and f(w) denotes
the corresponding density function. It is assumed that there is a closed
interval [w
L
; w
H
] over which f(w) is strictly positive, and that f(w) = 0 for
all w outside this interval. We assume 0 < w
L
< w
H
. Then
Z
w
H
w
L
f(w)dw = 1
and the per capita wealth is
w =
Z
w
H
w
L
wf(w)dw:
There are only two periods. For simplicity, we assume that there is no
consumption in period one
1
. In period one, each individual may choose
1
This assumption is also made by Gertler and Rogo (1990), but in their model, unlike
ours, entrepreneurship is not endogenous. Aghion and Bolton (1997) also assume that
consumption takes place after the realization of the investment.
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to be an entrepreneur (in which case he would carry out a risky business
activity, using part of his own wealth, plus some additional borrowing, to
nance his investment project), or he may choose not to be an entrepreneur
(in which case he would keep all his wealth in the form of a deposit in a
nancial institution, which oers him the safe market gross rate of return
r > 1). This rate is endogenous, and its determination will become clear as
we proceed. We assume that wealth, in its physical form, cannot be stored. It
follows that all wealth must eventually be lent (via the nancial institutions)
to entrepreneurs, who use them as input in their investment projects. We
adopt the standard assumption that nancial institutions are risk neutral
and perfectly competitive (their expected prots are zero).
Each entrepreneur can carry out only one investment project. Each
project requires

k units of wealth (one may think of this as a xed cost,
and that there is no variable cost). Each can turn out to be a success or a
failure. In the case of success, the pay-o of the project is a >

k. In the
case of failure, the pay-o is zero. The probability of success is denoted by
(e), where e is the eort level of the entrepreneur, which is not observable
by anyone, except the entrepreneur himself. For simplicity, we assume that
e can take only two possible values, 0 or 1. We write p = (1) > q = (0).
This indicates that the model exhibits the moral hazard property: the en-
trepreneur, who is a net borrower, may have an incentive to work at an eort
level that is lower than what would be ecient in a world of perfect infor-
mation. In what follows, we assume that p   q is suciently great, so that
the equilibrium contracts have the following property: entrepreneurs are suf-
ciently rewarded for success that they have an incentive to set e = 1 even
though e is not observable.We make the following assumption
ASSUMPTION A1:

k > w: (1)
Since each entrepreneur uses

k units of capital as input, this assumption
implies that in equilibrium, the endogenous number of entrepreneurs, N , is
less than the number of individuals in this economy, M .
Each individual has the following utility function
U = U(y; e) = v(y)  e;  > 0
where y denotes his wealth in period 2, e is his eort level, e 2 f0; 1g; and
 is a measure of eort cost. The function v(y) is increasing and strictly
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concave, indicating risk aversion. We assume that
v
0
(0) =1:
This assumption implies that each individual will invest some wealth in the
riskless asset, to avoid having zero wealth in period 2.
An entrepreneur can choose e to be 0 or 1. Non-entrepreneurs need not
expend any eort, thus their e is 0. (Note that in what follows, we normalize
by setting  = 1). We also make the following assumption, which implies that
even in the absence of nancial markets, it would pay for wealthy individuals
to invest in the risky asset and exert full eort:
ASSUMPTION A2:
pv(a) + (1  p)v(0)  1 > qv(a) + (1  q)v(0)
that is, in the absence of nancial markets, if an individual with wealth equal
to

k does not invest in the risky project, his utility will be v(0), (because by
assumption wealth is not storable), which is less than the expected utility of
investing, with eort e = 0, which in turn is less than the expected utility of
investing, with eort e = 1.
Assumption A2 can be stated as
(p  q) [v(a)  v(0)] > 1: (2)
While the outcome of any given project is uncertain, we assume the proba-
bility of success of any given project is independent of those of other projects,
and that the number of projects is large enough so that the law of large num-
ber applies. Thus, for the economy as a whole, if all entrepreneurs choose
e = 1, aggregate output is paN where N is the measure of the set of individ-
uals who, in equilibrium, choose to be entrepreneur. (Recall that the popu-
lation is M , and assumption A1 ensures that N  M).We also assume that
nancial institutions that try to recover part of their loans to entrepreneurs
who turn out to fail must incur some cost of settling the bankruptcy of these
entrepreneurs. In equilibrium, since all physical wealth must be invested, we
have
N

k =M w (3)
For the economy as a whole, the average gross rate of return on capital is
 =
paN   (1  p)BN
N

k
=
pa B

k
(4)
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where B is the average bankruptcy cost per entrepreneur, which depends (as
will become clear later) on how much each entrepreneur borrows. It follows
that
pa > 

k: (5)
Let r denote equilibrium riskless rate of interest that nancial intermediary
rms oer to depositors. Clearly, in equilibrium,  is greater than r because
the equilibrium contract between a nancial intermediary and a representa-
tive entrepreneur with wealth w must compensate for his risk bearing and his
eort e. In view of this observation and (5), we expect that the equilibrium
interest rate r is such that
r

k < pa + (1  p)0 (6)
2.2 The First Benchmark Case: Observable Eort and
No Bankruptcy Cost
If the eort level of each entrepreneur is observable, and if there is no
bankrupcy cost, then we are in the rst-best world. Since there is a contin-
uum of individuals and a continuum of investment projects, in the aggregate
there is no risk, and a perfect insurance market implies that all individuals
are perfectly insured, given that their function v(y) is strictly concave. If
the eort cost parameter  is suciently small, contracts will specify that
entrepreneurs must exercise full eort (e = 1), and get compensated for it.
The proof is straightforward. Assume it is optimal to choose full eort.
The appropriate maximization problem is to choose, for any given w, the
amount

k   k that the entrepreneur with with w is to borrow, and the
payments R and R
2
that he must make in the events of success and failure
respectively, so as to maximize his expected utility subject to zero expected
prots
max pv [(w   k)r + a R] + (1  p)v [(w   k)r  R
2
]  1
subject to
pR + (1  p)R
2
= r(

k   k)
The solution yields constant utility across state of nature
(w   k)r + a R = (w   k)r  R
2
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R = (1  p)a+ r(

k   k)
and
R
2
= R  a
Amore interesting case is full information, but in the presence of bankruptcy
cost. We will look at this case after analyzing the moral hazard case.
2.3 The Moral Hazard Case: Unobservable Eort
Now we turn to the case of unobservable eort levels. We assume that each
entrepreneur's wealth is known to the nancial intermediaries. This, and
the assumption that individuals have the same utility function and identical
ability means that there is no adverse selection problem: no one can lie
about his wealth or his utility function. The only problem is moral hazard:
if how much an entrepreneur must pay back to the nancial intermediaries
is independent of his eort level, then he may have an incentive to exert no
eort. Contracts must therefore be designed to provide sucient incentive
for enterpreneurs to choose e = 1 . (This is of course based on the assumption
that p  q is suciently great to justify the choice e = 1:)
We now describe a contract for an entrepreneur with wealth level w.
This contract says that \if your wealth is w and you contribute an amount
k  minf

k; wg as your \equity" in your investment project (so that your
borrowing from your nancial institution is

k  k  0; and you deposit your
remaining w   k at a nancial institution that gives you the safe rate of
return r), then you must pay back to your lender (the nancial institution,
or FI for short) an amount which depends on the outcome of your project.
If the outcome is \success", your investment yields the gross return a, and
you must pay an amount R to your FI; if your outcome is \failure" (the
investment yields a gross return of zero), then, with your period two wealth
(w   k)r, you must pay back to the FI an amount (

k   k) > 0 where  is
a small positive number". (In what follows, we assume  < r.)
It follows that if the entrepreneur exerts eort (i.e., e = 1), then his
expected utility is
pv [(w   k)r + a R] + (1  p)v
h
(w   k)r   (

k   k)
i
  1  F (w; k; R; 1)
and if he does not exert eort (i.e., e = 0), then his expected utility is
qv [(w   k)r + a  R] + (1  q)v
h
(w   k)r   (

k   k)
i
 F (w; k; R; 0)
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We assume also that when a bankrupt entrepreneur pays the amount
(

k  k) > 0 to his FI, the latter only gets a fraction  of it: In other words,
the FI incurs a real cost (1 )(

k k) in collecting (

k k) from the failed
entrepreneur.
Thus an FI that lends the amount

k   k to an entrepreneur who does
exert eort can expect to get
pR + (1  p)(

k   k)
On the other hand, the FI takes r as given, and must pay the amount r(

k k)
to depositors. In equilibrium, we have the following zero expected prot
condition (if e = 1):
pR + (1  p)(

k   k) = r(

k   k) (7)
Competition among the FIs imply that, for given r, the FIs will oer
to any entrepreneur with wealth w a contract that maximizes his expected
utility, subject to the zero prot condition. We also assume that the contract
provides enough incentive for the entrepreneur to exert eort (e = 1). More
formally, FI j will oer to the entrepreneur with wealth w a pair of num-
bers (R; k) that maximizes F (w; k; R; 1) subject to the incentive compatibility
constraint
F (w; k; R; 1)  F (w; k; R; 0) (8)
and the zero prot constraint (7).
3 Properties of the Equilibrium Contracts
We now turn to a fuller characterization of equilibrium contracts. We proceed
as follows. First, we take the interest rate r as given, and show how the
incentive compatibility constraint and the zero prot condition determine
the contract for entrepreneurs at each wealth level. Then we show how the
the interest rate r is determined endogenously.
3.1 Equilibrium loan contracts for entrepreneurs, given
the interest rate on the safe asset
In equilibrium, prot will be zero, and the incentive compatibility constraint
binds for each entrepreneur. The participation constraint also binds, but only
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in the sense that (w) will be \bid up" so that it is the equilibrium expected
utility level of the entrepreneur with wealth w. It follows that, for given r,
conditions (7) and (8) determine the equilibrium contract for entrepreneurs
with wealth w. The following lemma characterizes the equilibrium contract,
under the assumption that  is small:
LEMMA 1: (Equilibrium contract) In equilibrium, the entrepreneur
with wealth w will be lent the amount z(w) and will be asked to pay the
amount R(w) in the event of success, and z(w) in the event of failure, where
z(w) =

k   k(w); and the pair (R(w); k(w)) satisfy the following equations
R =
(

k   k)
p
[r   (1  p)] for k 

k (9)
and
v [(w   k)r + a R]  v
h
(w   k)r   (

k   k)
i
=
1
p  q
(10)
Proof: See the Appendix.
REMARK 1: Equation (9) implies that the repayment to the FI (in
the event of success) per dollar borrowed is a constant, independent of the
amount borrowed:
r
s

R

k   k
=
1
p
[r   (1  p)] :
(Note that the repayment received by the FI, in the event of failure, is 
per dollar borrowed.)
REMARK 2: Equation (9) can be represented by the downward sloping
curve KK in the (k; R) space, with the vertical intercept[r   (1  p)]

k=p.
If p   q is suciently close to one, and  is suciently small, then the
intercept of the second curve (dened by (10) and denoted as the curve
V V ) is below [r   (1  p)]

k=p and hence the two curves will have an
intersection (k(w); R(w)) with k(w) > 0 and R(w) > 0, if w is not too small.
LEMMA 2: Entrepreneurs with greater w will borrow less (i.e.

k k(w)
decreases with wealth) and hence invest more (put more equity) in the risky
project, i.e. k
0
(w) > 0, given that contracts must satisfy (9) and (10).
Proof: Note that the curve KK is independent of w. For any given k,
an increase in w will shift the curve V V down, resulting in an intersection
to the right of the former intersection. Hence k

increases, and R

decreases.
This means the individual borrows less when his wealth increases.
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REMARK 3: One of the standard text-book results is that if the payo
per dollar invested a risky asset in each state of nature is given (i.e., in-
dependent of the amount invested in the risky asset), then the amount an
individual invests in the risky asset is an increasing function of his wealth if
and only if his absolute risk aversion is a decreasing function of wealth. Our
result in Lemma 2 is dierent, because the pay-o per dollar of equity in
the event of success is

s
=
a  R
k
=
a
k
 
1
pk
[r   (1  p)] (

k   k)
which is dependent on k (decreasing in k). (And similarly, the pay-o per
dollar of equity in the event of failure increases in k.) Lemma 1 states that,
with a concave utility function, but independently of whether absolute risk
aversion is a decreasing or increasing function, entrepreneurs with greater
wealth will contribute more equity in the project.
LEMMA 3: Given that contracts must satisfy (9) and (10), entrepreneurs
with greater w will invest MORE in the riskless asset, (i.e., w   k

(w) in-
creases with w), and at the same time putting more equity in the risky
project, if and only if the following condition holds
v
0
(s)(r   ) > [v
0
(u)  v
0
(s)]p (11)
where u is the wealth in the failure state,
u  u(w)  (w   k(w))r   (

k   k(w)) (12)
and s is the wealth in the success state,
s  s(w)  (w   k(w))r + a  R(w) (13)
Proof: From (9) and (10), we get
dk
dw
=
[v
0
(u)  v
0
(s)] pr
[v
0
(u)  v
0
(s)] pr + v
0
(s)(r   )  [v
0
(u)  v
0
(s)]p
(14)
which is less than 1 if and only if (11) holds.
REMARK: Condition (11) holds if  is small, which is assumed here.
10
3.2 An example
Let
v(y) = ln y
then we obtain from (10)
ln
"
(w   k)r + a  R
(w   k)r   (

k   k)
#
=
1
p  q
hence
wr   kr + a  (

k   k)r
s
=
h
wr   kr   (

k   k)
i
e
1=(p q)
Thus
h
r
s
+ (r   )e
1=(p q)
  r
i
k =
h
r
s
  e
1=(p q)
i

k   a+ rw
h
e
1=(p q)
  1
i
(15)
i.e.,
k(w) =
h
r
s
  e
1=(p q)
i

k   a+ rw
h
e
1=(p q)
  1
i
[r
s
+ (r   )e
1=(p q)
  r]
(16)
which is positive if w is not too small, and
dk
dw
=
h
e
1=(p q)
  1
i
r
[e
1=(p q)
  1] r + [r
s
  e
1=(p q)
]
which is positive and less than 1 provided  is small. This is consistent with
Lemmas 2 and 3.
3.3 To be or not to be an entrepreneur
So far, we have characterized contracts that the FIs oer to potential en-
trepreneurs with wealth w, which would make him choose e = 1, assuming
that he does want to be an entrepreneur. But depending on his wealth, an
individual may nd that the utility of being a lender; v(rw), may exceed the
expected utility of being an entrepreneur, i.e., it is possible that, for some w,
we have
v(rw) > EU  pv(s) + (1  p)v(u)  1 (17)
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Clearly, if w is close to zero, condition (17) will be satised. Thus the
curve v(rw) lies above the curve EU when w is small: At some
b
w > 0, the
curve EU cuts the curve v(rw) from below (here, some assumptions may be
needed to ensure that such a crossing exists.) The question is whether there
exists some value
e
w >
b
w such that the curve v(rw) again overtakes the curve
EU . The answer turns out to depends on the convexity of the following
function
 (y) 
1
v
0
(y)
which measures the marginal rate of substitution between eort and income:
MRS
ey
=  
U
e
U
y
=
1
v
0
(y)
LEMMA 5:
If  (y) is concave, then
p
v
0
(s)
+
1  p
v
0
(u)

1
v
0
(ps+ (1  p)u)
(18)
and if  (y) is convex, then
p
v
0
(s)
+
1  p
v
0
(u)

1
v
0
(ps+ (1  p)u)

1
v
0
(rw)
(19)
Proof: The rst inequality in (19) follows from Jensen's inequality.The
second inequality in(19) holds if and only if
rw < ps+ (1  p)u (20)
Now ps + (1  p)u = rw   rk(w) + pa   (

k   k(w))[r   (1  p)(   1)] '
rw + pa  r

k > rw because of (6).
LEMMA 6: If  (y) is convex, then the curve EU may cut the curve
v(rw) from below at some value
b
w > 0, and then from above, at some value
e
w >
b
w.
Proof: see the appendix.
REMARK:  (r) is convex if and only if the coecient of prudence is
smaller than twice the coecient of absolute risk aversion:
 
2v
00
v
0
  
v
000
v
00
(21)
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(the right-hand side of (21) is called the coecient of prudence by Kimball,
1990). Note that decreasing absolute risk aversion holds i
 
v
000
v
00
>  
v
00
v
0
which is not inconsistent with (21).
Proposition 1: if the coecient of prudence is smaller than twice the
coecient of absolute risk aversion, then it is possible that, given r, there are
two values
b
w(r) <
e
w(r) such that only individuals whose wealth lies between
them will choose to be entrepreneurs. Individuals with wealth exceeding
e
w(r), and those with wealth below
b
w(r) will choose to invest in the safe asset
(i.e., lend to nancial intermediaries).
REMARK: Proposition 1 may be explained as follows: given that the
marginal rate of substitution between eort and incone is convex in y, indi-
viduals with very low wealth do not want to become entrepreneur because
they are not willing to take risks, and individuals who are very wealthy do
not want to become entrepreneur because they do not want to exert eort.
We now show how the two critical values
b
w(r) and
e
w(r) change when r
increases.
Proposition 2:
b
w
0
(r) > 0 and
e
w
0
(r) < 0 if

k   w
H
w
H
  k(w
H
)
> (1  p)
where   f(r   )=(r   )g   1  0
Proof : see the appendix.
EXAMPLE (CONTINUED)
The critical values of w which makes an individual with wealth w indif-
ferent between being or not being an entrepreneur is
ln(wr) = p ln
h
(w   k(w))r + a  r
s
(

k   k(w))
i
+
(1  p) ln
h
(w   k(w))r   (

k   k(w))
i
  1 (22)
where k(w) is linear in w, and is given by (16) above. This equation can have
several roots. For example, if p = 0:5 then (22) may be written as (using the
13
fact that ln e = 1)
(ewr)
2
=
h
(w   k(w))r + a  r
s
(

k   k(w))
i h
(w   k(w))r   (

k   k(w))
i
(23)
This is a quadratic equation in w, and under suitable assumptions will have
two positive real roots.
3.4 Endogenous determination of the interest rate on
the safe asset
So far, we have taken the interest rate r as given. Now we turn to its
determination. This is given by the condition that the the interest rate
must equate the aggregate lending by non-entrepreneurs (to the nancial
institutions) to the aggregate borrowing by entrepreneurs (from the nancial
institutions). The former is given by
L(r) =
Z
bw(r)
w
L
wf(w)dw+
Z
w
H
ew(r)
wf(w)dw
and the latter is
B(r) =
Z
ew(r)
bw(r)
(

k   w)f(w)dw
The excess demand (function) for fund is
D(r) = B(r) L(r) =

k
Z
ew(r)
bw(r)
f(w)dw 
Z
w
H
w
L
wf(w)dw =

k
Z
ew(r)
bw(r)
f(w)dw  w
Clearly, if r is very high, then D(r) < 0, and if if r = 0, then D(r) < 0 (recall
that

k > w). By continuity, there exists a value r

such that D(r

) = 0.
Furthermore, such r

is unique, because D
0
(r) < 0: Thus we obtain the
following result:
Proposition 3: There exists a unique r

> 0 such that the loan market
clears. Individuals with wealth exceeding
e
w(r

) lend all their wealth to the
nancial institutions, at the safe interest rate r

, and so do individuals with
wealth below
b
w(r

). Individuals whose wealth lies between these two critical
values will be entrepreneurs, and they invest a fraction of their wealth in
the safe asset, the remaining fraction being used as equity capital, which is
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always less than the total amount of capital invested in each risky project.
The equilibrium number of entrepreneurs is
N =
M w

k
=
Z
ew(r)
bw(r)
f(w)dw.
4 Comparison with the Second Benchmark
Case: Full Information, with Bankruptcy
Cost
Now we return to the full information case, but we add the assumptions that
(i) in the event of failure, the entrepreneur must pay back to the nancial
intermediary (FI) a fraction of the amount he borrows, (

k   k), and (ii)
due to bankruptcy cost, the FI only obtains a fraction  < 1 of this amount.
Then the appropriate maximization problem is to choose, for any given w,
the pair (R; k) that maximizes
pv [(w   k)r + a  R] + (1  p)v
h
(w   k)r   (

k   k)
i
  1
subject to
pR + (1  p)(

k   k) = r(

k   k)
After inserting the zero prot condition into the objective function, we get
the rst order condition
v
0
(u)
v
0
(s)
=
r   
r   
> 1 (24)
where
s  (w   k)r + a  R
and
u  (w   k)r
(Note that  is exogenously specied).Thus, with the bankruptcy cost factor
 < 1, marginal utilities are not equalized across states of nature.
In this case, the condition for an individual to prefer being an entrepreneur
to being a pure lender is
EU(w)  pv(s) + (1  p)v(u)  1 > v(wr)
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Again, we must compare the slope of the EU curve with the slope of the
right-hand side (with respect to w). The slope of the EU curve is
pv
0
(s) + (1  p)v
0
(u) = [1 + ] v
0
(s)r
where
 
(1  )(1  p)
r   
If, given r, at any w

such that EU(w

) = v(w

r), the following condition
holds
v
0
(s)
v
0
(w

r)
>
1
1 + 
(25)
then we can conclude that all individuals with wealth below w

will be lenders
and all other individuals will be entrepreneurs. Given our assumption, con-
dition (25) is likely to be met.
The above analysis shows that under full information with bankruptcy
cost (and the assumption that failed entrepreneurs must pay (

k   k)), the
pattern of entrepreneurial choice is quite dierent from that under moral
hazard: there is no \re-switching."
5 International Borrowing Under the Moral
Hazard Case
Now consider two countries with the same population size and the same level
of per capita wealth, but dierent distributions of wealth. We will look at
their autarkic equilibria, and examine the incentive for international borrow-
ing. Let us assume there are two countries, A and B. The density functions of
the two wealth distributions are respectively f
A
(w; 
A
) and f
B
(w; 
B
), where

A
and 
B
are shift parameters. Now consider the autarkic equilibrium of
country A, and let r
A
be the autarkic interest rate. Consider the following
thought experiment: Suppose the distribution f
A
(:) undergoes a change: 
A
now becomes 

A
, which makes f
A
(w; 

A
) < f
A
(w; 
A
) for all w in the in-
terval [
b
w(r
A
);
e
w(r
A
)]. Then clearly at the value r
A
, the number of willing
entrepreneurs will be less than N . To restore equilibrium, r must be lower.
It follows from the above reasoning that if the density function f
B
(w; 
B
)
diers from f
A
(w; 
A
) in that
f
B
(w; 
B
) < f
A
(w; 
A
) for all w 2 [
b
w(r
A
);
e
w(r
A
)]
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then country B will have a higher autarkic gross rate of return: r
B
> r
A
Under
these conditions, the opening of world nancial markets will result in capital
ow from A to B. We obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 4: Two countries with identical per capita wealth and iden-
tical individual utility function may engage in intertemporal trade if the dis-
tributions of wealth are dierent.
6 Bailouts
In this section, we set up a framework for studying the implications of gov-
ernment policies that seek to help bankrupt entrepreneurs. Suppose the
government taxes successful entrepreneurs, collecting from them amount T
each, and pay the unsuccessful ones an amount : Balanced budget requires
that
pT
Z
ew(r)
bw(r)
f(w)dw = (1  p)
Z
ew(r)
bw(r)
f(w)dt (26)
where [
b
w(r);
e
w(r)] are solutions of the equation
v(rw) = pv [(w   k)r + (a  R)  T ]+(1 p)v
h
(w   k)r   (

k   k) + 
i
 1
Does this bailout policy result in a lower or higher equilibrium interest rate?
What is its implication on the country's net borrowing?
First, note that (26) implies that
dT
d
=
1  p
p
The contract between the nancial intermediary (FI) and the entrepreneur
with wealth w must now satisfy
(p  q) [v(s)  v(u)] = 1 (27)
and
pR =


k   k

[r   (1  p)] (28)
where now
s  (w   k)r + (a R)  T
and
u  (w   k)r   (

k   k) + 
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From (27) and (28), we have
@k
@T
=
pv
0
(s)
pv
0
(u)(r   ) + (1  p)v
0
(s)(r   )
and
@k
@
=
pv
0
(u)
pv
0
(u)(r   ) + (1  p)v
0
(s)(r   )
Hence
dk
d
=
@k
@T
dT
d
+
@k
@
=
(1  p)v
0
(s) + pv
0
(u)
pv
0
(u)(r   ) + (1  p)v
0
(s)(r   )
To nd the respose of the intersection points
e
w(r) and
b
w(r) with respect
to , we use the equation of indierence, which is now
q
p  q
+ v
h
(w   k

)r   (

k   k

) + 
i
= v(wr) (29)
where k

= k

(w; T; (T )). From (29) we get
dw
d
=

1


(1  p)v
0
(u)v
0
(s)(   1)
(1  p)v
0
(s)(r   ) + pv
0
(u)(r   )
(30)
where
 = v
0
(s)
"
r   (r   )
@k
@w
#
  v
0
(NE)r (31)
which is positive at
b
w(r) and negative at
e
w(r). Hence, for a given r,
b
w(r)
increases and
e
w(r) decreases when there is an increase in . This implies that
the number of entrepreneurs increases, leading to an increases in the demand
for fund. To restore equilibrium, the rate of interest r must increase.
Proposition 5: Bail-out policies of the type described above will lead to
an increase in the equilibrium rate of interest. In a two-country world, this
means that the country with such bail-out policies will become the debtor
country.
Remark: The role of the bankuptcy cost factor  < 1 is crucial here. If
 = 1, then bail-out has no eect on the equilibrium interest rate.
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7 Concluding remarks
We have set up a model to show that a country's wealth distribution in-
uences the occupational choice of individuals: to be or not to be an en-
trepreneur. We have also showed that countries that have the same level
of per capita wealth and the same individual utility function may engage in
mutual intertemporal trade, as long as they have dierent wealth distribu-
tions. The key element in our model is the tension between consumption
smoothing across states of nature on the one hand, and contract design to
overcome moral hazard on the other hand.
There are several directions of generalization, which we wish to pursue in
our future work. An obvious extension is the process of capital accumulation.
One would then be able to see how moral hazard and initial wealth distribu-
tions inuence growth rates, and to determine conditions under which cycles
may occur. Taxation policies, including transfers, may be studied in the
context of moral hazard and endogenous choice of occupation.
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APPENDIX
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Consider the problem
max
R;k
F (R; k; w; 1) = pv((w  k)r+ a R)+ (1  p)v((w  k)r (

k  k))  1
subject to
v((w   k)r + a  R)  v((w   k)r   (

k   k)) 
1
p  q
(32)
and
pR  (

k   k) [r   (1  p)]  0 (33)
In the (k; R) space, the feasible set is the intersection of area above the line
R =
(

k   k)
p
[r   (1  p)] (34)
with the area below the (positively sloped) curve dened by (32). Now it
is easy to verify that the objective function F (R; k; w; 1) is strictly concave
and decreasing in (k; R). This means that the iso-expected utility curves are
concave in the (k; R) space, with negative slope given by
@R
@k
=
 F
k
F
R
which can be shown to be steeper than the slope of the line (34) if  is small:
It follows that the maximum occurs at the point where both constraints hold
with equality.
PROOF OF LEMMA 5
We nd conditions for the slope of EU to be greater or smaller than the
slope of v(NE) at their intersection.
Proof:
Recall that from LEMMA 2 and 3, k is an increasing function of w, and
@k
@w
=
pr [v
0
(u)  v
0
(s)]
pv
0
(u)(r   ) + (1  p)v
0
(s)(r   )
(35)
Now at any intersection between EU and v(rw), we must have
pv(s) + (1  p)v(u) = v(rw)
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This and (10) give
q
p  q
+ v(u) = v(rw)  v(NE) (36)
The slope (with respect to w) of the LHS of (36) is greater than the slope
of the RHS of (36) i
G  v
0
(u)
"
r   (r   )
@k
@w
#
  rv
0
(NE) > 0 (37)
which is equivalent to
r   (r   )
@k
@w
>
rv
0
(NE)
v
0
(u)
i.e.,
"
1 
v
0
(NE)
v
0
(u)
#
r > (r   )
@k
@w
i.e.,
"
v
0
(u)  v
0
(NE)
v
0
(u)
#
> (r   )
p [v
0
(u)  v
0
(s)]
pv
0
(u)(r   ) + (1  p)v
0
(s)(r   )
i.e.,
"
v
0
(u)  v
0
(NE)
v
0
(u)
#
>
p [v
0
(u)  v
0
(s)]
pv
0
(u) + (1  p)v
0
(s)f(r   )=(r   )g
(38)
Let 1 +  = f(r   )=(r   )g  1. If (38) holds, then
"
v
0
(u)  v
0
(NE)
v
0
(u)
#
>
p [v
0
(u)  v
0
(s)]
pv
0
(u) + (1  p)v
0
(s)(1 + )
(39)
Now (39) holds i
"
pv
0
(u) + (1  p)v
0
(s)(1 + )
v
0
(u)v
0
(s)
#
[v
0
(u)  v
0
(NE)] >
p [v
0
(u)  v
0
(s)]
v
0
(s)
(40)
Let
Z =
pv
0
(u) + (1  p)v
0
(s)
v
0
(u)v
0
(s)
(41)
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.Then (40) is
1 + (1  p)
"
1 
v
0
(NE)
v
0
(u)
#
> zv
0
(NE) (42)
So we require, for EU to cut v(NE) from below, that
Zv
0
(NE)  (1  p)
"
1 
v
0
(NE)
v
0
(u)
#
< 1 (43)
A sucient condition for the slope of EU to be greater than the slope of
v(NE) is zv
0
(NE) < 1. Now zv
0
(NE) < 1 if and only if
p
v
0
(s)
+
1  p
v
0
(u)
<
1
v
0
(NE)
(44)
i.e. if  (w) is strictly concave. It follows that (a) if  (w) is strictly concave,
then the EU curve cannot cut the v(NE) curve from above, and (b) if  (w)
is convex, then the EU curve may cut the v(NE) curve from above, at some
e
w >
b
w.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
From (9) and (10), we have
@k
@w
=
1

[v
0
(u)  v
0
(s)] pr > 0
and
@k
@r
=
1

h
fv
0
(u)  v
0
(s)g(w   k)p+ v
0
(s)(

k   k)
i
where
 = pv
0
(u)(r   ) + (1  p)v
0
(s)(r   ) > 0
Dierentiating the condition for indierence (equation (36)) with respect to
r, we get
dw
dr
=
1
G
"
wv
0
(NE)  v
0
(u)(w   k) + (r   )v
0
(u)
@k
@r
#
(45)
where G, dened in (37) above, is positive at
b
w(r) and negative at
e
w(r). The
numerator in(45) must now be signed. It can be written as
wv
0
(NE) + v
0
(u)
"
p(w   k)fv
0
(u)  v
00
(s)g+ v
0
(s)(

k   k)
pv
0
(u) + (1  p)v
0
(s)(1 + )
  (w   k)
#
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The term inside the square brackets can be written as
v
0
(s)(w   k)
"

k   k
w   k
  1  (1  p)
#
or
v
0
(s)(w   k)
"

k   w
w   k
  (1  p)
#
Now, since w   k(w) is increasing in w, we have

k   w
w   k(w)
>

k   w
w
H
  k(w
H
)
>

k   w
H
w
H
  k(w
H
)
which is positive if

k > w
H
and  is suciently small.
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